Politics

[cpr0312]

 

[Wheels]

 

[PARA45]

 

[cpr0312]

Sums it up

 

[cpr0312]

 

[Wheels]

 

[Woodcarver]

View attachment 449365

No racism here. Move along....

 

[Newboomer]

View attachment 449332

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Nothing like hiding out to avoid looking any more of a damn fool than he already is.

 

[375 Ruger Fan]

 

[Wheels]

 

[Spooksar]

And that was meant to be the game changer, the rollout of Biden 2.0. Take off the 2 and it is about right.

Oh yes the coward of the cottage

 

[Vashper]

Always good when another old soldier joins this discussion. We need to have a vodka sometime and decide if we were looking at each other across the Fulda Gap a long time ago.

Let me provide some Western perspective.

Russia does indeed have a bit of leverage with its natural gas exports. However, it is a double edged sword - one I'll come back to in a bit.

Lavrov sounds like he is making either veiled economic threats, or perhaps, he implies that the US and perhaps Europe should be concerned in some way by Russian economic desires.

However, a little perspective is useful.

Russia has an annual GDP of approximately 1.7 trillion USD. That is seemingly a large number. However, France has a GDP of 2.7 trillion USD. Just the state of Texas has a GDP of 1.6 trillion - about the same as Russia. California's economy, with a GDP of 2.6 trillion USD, is an economy the size of France. The combined economies of the G7 (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK, and the US) have a GDP of 38.6 trillion USD. To be blunt, the western powers are only mildly interested in Russia's economic wishes and demands.

As noted above, Russia does have some leverage through natural gas. However, it is hardly the only source. Texas, for instance, with an economy the size of Russia and no massive military expenditures dragging on it, would be delighted to increase its natural gas output and reap those profits. So, whose economy would be damaged more by closing those exports? Such an action would be inconvenient to the Eurozone, but would devastating to Russia's economy.

I frankly do not understand Putin's foreign policy goals. Yes, he does control the USSR's nuclear stockpile. It is what makes issues like the Ukraine so potentially dangerous. But to what end? Russia, were it embrace the vision of Peter the Great, and work to fully integrating itself into Europe, would have, economically, a strong voice in European affairs. It would not have to worry about buffer zones made up of client states; nations that today, are now largely suspicious if not actually hostile to Russian stated security interests.

And Putin is smart enough to know that no real alliance is possible with China other than a periodic and very temporary marriage of convenience. China's GDP is 23 trillion USD; second only to the US. Xi really isn't very concerned about what Russia thinks on any meaningful subject unless it directly supports Chinese national interests - most of which are not in Russia's.

Sadly, I am afraid no fundamental change in the relationship with Europe is possible as long as the current generation is in power in Russia. They, and people like you and me, are burdened with too much history. Until then, we are going to continue to see these periodic crises, and Russia will continue to be on the outside rattling its rusting saber looking in on the most significant international issues.

Instead, we should all be warily focused on China.

And to be fair, I should also note that the dangers of the current situation are compounded by the leadership vacuum that currently exists in the US. It is an environment where mistakes can be made..


Всегда хорошо, когда к этой дискуссии присоединяется еще один старый солдат. Нам нужно как-нибудь выпить водки и решить, смотрели ли мы друг на друга через Фульдский ущелье давным-давно.

Позвольте мне представить некоторые западные точки зрения.

Россия действительно имеет некоторое влияние на экспорт природного газа. Тем не менее, это палка о двух концах, к которой я еще вернусь.

Лавров звучит так, будто он либо делает завуалированные экономические угрозы, либо, возможно, намекает на то, что США и, возможно, Европа должны быть каким-то образом обеспокоены экономическими устремлениями России.

Тем не менее, немного перспективы полезно.

Годовой ВВП России составляет около 1,7 трлн долларов США. Казалось бы, это большое число. Однако ВВП Франции составляет 2,7 трлн долларов США. Только у штата Техас ВВП 1,6 трлн - примерно столько же, сколько у России. Экономика Калифорнии с ВВП в 2,6 трлн долларов США имеет размер экономики Франции. Совокупная экономика G7 (Канада, Франция, Германия, Италия, Япония, Великобритания и США) имеет ВВП в размере 38,6 трлн долларов США. Откровенно говоря, западные державы лишь слегка интересуются экономическими желаниями и требованиями России.

Как отмечалось выше, у России есть определенные рычаги влияния за счет природного газа. Однако вряд ли это единственный источник. Техас, например, с экономикой размером с Россию и без огромных военных расходов, тянущих его за собой, был бы рад увеличить добычу природного газа и получить эту прибыль. Итак, чьей экономике больше повредит закрытие этого экспорта? Такая акция была бы неудобна для еврозоны, но разрушительна для экономики России.

Я откровенно не понимаю внешнеполитических целей Путина. Да, он контролирует ядерный арсенал СССР. Именно это делает такие вопросы, как Украина, потенциально опасными. Но с какой целью? Россия, если бы она приняла видение Петра Великого и стремилась полностью интегрироваться в Европу, в экономическом отношении она имела бы сильный голос в европейских делах. Ему не нужно было бы беспокоиться о буферных зонах, состоящих из клиентских состояний; страны, которые сегодня в значительной степени подозрительны, если не враждебны, по отношению к заявленным Россией интересам безопасности.

А Путин достаточно умен, чтобы понимать, что никакой реальный союз с Китаем невозможен, кроме периодического и очень временного брака по расчету. ВВП Китая составляет 23 триллиона долларов США; уступает только США. Си на самом деле не очень беспокоит, что Россия думает по какому-либо значимому вопросу, если только она напрямую не поддерживает национальные интересы Китая, большинство из которых выражены не на русском языке.

К сожалению, я боюсь, что коренные изменения в отношениях с Европой невозможны, пока у власти в России находится нынешнее поколение. Они и такие люди, как вы и я, обременены слишком большой историей. А до тех пор мы будем продолжать сталкиваться с этими периодическими кризисами, а Россия будет по-прежнему находиться в стороне, бряцая своей ржавой саблей, глядя на самые важные международные проблемы.

Вместо этого мы все должны с осторожностью сосредоточиться на Китае.

И справедливости ради, я должен также отметить, что опасности нынешней ситуации усугубляются вакуумом лидерства, который в настоящее время существует в США. Это среда, в которой можно совершать ошибки.

I am touched by the translation into Russian. Thanks. But I think that it is not necessary to make it difficult for other participants to contemplate incomprehensible krakozabras, since I, like most Internet users, read a little English, and for large texts I use Google and Yandex translators.
Not all questions are easy to answer, but not because they are very difficult. Here, for example, how to answer the question“ "why do blondes dye their hair roots in a dark color?”. An exhaustive answer, firstly, will break some ideological patterns, and secondly, it may offend the questioner.
In addition, there is also such a moment: "the tragedy of history is that everyone is right”" As a rule, everyone has rational arguments. Just as an example: the Chinese believe that Taiwan is part of China. Moreover, the people of Taiwan, in general, think the same, except for a few separatists, although they are dissatisfied with the current government of China. And someone needs a policy of "two Chinas". That is, there may be different views on the same fact, and all of them are correct, just different positions.
Well, there are also cultural differences. In America, as emigrants write and Hollywood shows, the norm of relations even at work between colleagues is demonstrative bullying. Therefore, completely innocent gestures are perceived strangely. I remember a certain blonde journalist interviewed Putin, and almost fainted from horror (she wrote it herself, I read it) when he asked about the health of her children. For Russians, this is an element of politeness, she understood it as a direct and obvious threat.
This is the preamble, I wrote the whole article, but I shortened it.

Lavrov, of course, did not threaten anyone. He reported to Parliament, what are the threats there? He was making excuses. It was about American threats (Biden and not only) to deprive Russia of the opportunity to use dollars, which are used on many commodity exchanges and in foreign exchange reserves. This is a really direct and obvious threat. We have a vulnerability (dependence on the dollar), so Lavrov explained to congressmen who is to blame for this and what to do in this situation.
After all, we don't need dollars at all, we don't have any trade with America. America buys some small things from us (rocket engines, complex parts for Boeing, in my opinion enriched uranium, if they haven't stopped it yet), but it's not much. We mainly sell raw materials to Europe, and we buy goods in China – what's the use of dollars here? It's just the established world practice that everything goes through dollar exchanges. And how will we buy something critically important, such as food, if (quote from an American forum): "Russia can not make an effort a war. Their GNP is less than Italy and if international sanction are imposed , Russia will be implode lacking everything from foods, medicine etc. The West could starve them to death and create a civilwar where they start eating they own dead in the bitter end”.
Well, such a touch, strictly between us. "Nord Stream" is more of a German project than a Russian one. Do you understand? (just don't tell anyone).

You may be right that China pursues its own interests, but it doesn't care about ours. But the West doesn't care about our interests either (you write about it yourself), so what's the difference? What is the point of us participating in a crusade against China, and obviously losing? Moreover, the Americans themselves have not decided what they should do after Afghanistan, either to fight with China against Russia, or with Russia against China (from some American forum):

“Member1“My opinion is that the USA and Russia will ally again one day — against China.“

Member2: And you are a lame-brained idiot. The fact is, Russia and China are make mutual
overtures as you penned your idiocy.
Your fat-assed goofball took the Chinese on in a stupid trade war. With Trump and you freaks running around and screaming your brains outs, do you think that China will trust this country again? Fool.”
You see, China does not interfere in our affairs, it does not occur to the Chinese to pay dearly and receive some whores in the State Department who staged dances in the altar of the main Orthodox church. And to support thousands of organizations that operate in the country and interfere in political processes (only in Kazakhstan there are now 1600, we probably have more).

What is the goal of Putin's policy? I'm not a telepath, I don't know, but I think the main thing is security. The same process has been going on for decades: the United States, using its influence on local elites and the media, somehow promotes military infrastructure closer to the main centers of Russia. Under completely ridiculous pretexts, such as "they demanded joining NATO, well, what can we do?”. The interests of Russia do not care, but the interests of Estonia are important, it is worth the danger of nuclear war. Apparently, Estonia's GDP is much larger than Russia's GDP (this is sarcasm, in fact – no). It definitely won't work on Putin, he himself asked for NATO in 2002 - they didn't take him .

Here you yourself, as a military man, how would you assess the situation when a geopolitical opponent mounts rocket launchers nearby with a flight time of 5-7 minutes?

And so, for fun. A couple of posts are already from the Russian sector of the Internet:
"Americans are amazing people. They know for sure that the media is lying to them – and they think exactly what the media tells them about the outside world”"
“You are very naive if you think that you can convince American citizens using chat. The more they invent horror stories for themselves, the less truth and historical facts are available to them, the dumber they are, the weaker they are in front of us. They don't know that Russians are intelligent, knowledgeable people, capable of analyzing and thinking quickly. This is our secret weapon."

 

[sgt_zim]

That was thoughtful, an actual Russian's insight on this is valuable.

This American doesn't believe anything the US press tells him. The press corps is filled with ideological Marxists, and so is the US state department. If you want the truth from either group, you must first assume that whatever they are saying is purely agitprop.

 

[WAB]

I totally agree. A big problem we have is that most Americans are not well read or well travelled. Their world view is shaped by the media, and to a lesser extent the government. When you combine that with the education system’s failure to teach critical thinking skills, you get the mess we are in today.

 

[VertigoBE]

Here you yourself, as a military man, how would you assess the situation when a geopolitical opponent mounts rocket launchers nearby with a flight time of 5-7 minutes?

For me, this whole Ukraine situation can be summarised to the above simple statement.

Russia cannot be conquered, it is too vast. But it can be invaded. Unfortunately for them, their capital is quite close to its border with Europe. As invasions by European countries have been tried before, all failed due to the vast distances and Russian winters. From Napoleon to Hitler. (In Wikipedia I found a total of 8 invasions coming from their western side, since 1571)

As Russia does not have the economy to outspend NATO on Defense matters, they need to protect that advantage of distance.

The EU/US has been, since the fall of the Soviet Union quite belligerent (figuratively) in expanding itself and/or NATO eastwards, therefore removing step by step the distance advantage of Russia. With Ukraine, Putin drew a line, as this would
A. Allow Ukraine to become NATO, and thus have rockets at only a few 100 Km from the Kremlin.
B. Compromise their access to the Black Sea, and thus the Mediterranean Sea, their southern maritime access, when the northern one freezes over in part in the winter.

It makes total sense for Russia to say stop. The US said the same thing when Cuba happened.

But I do also fully agree with @Red Leg ‘s comment where you say that it is a generational problem. Too many people in power today were in the trenches (figuratively) during the Cold War. It will require a new generation to have the hotheadedness cool down a bit.

 

[Vashper]

For me, this whole Ukraine situation can be summarised to the above simple statement.

Russia cannot be conquered, it is too vast. But it can be invaded. Unfortunately for them, their capital is quite close to its border with Europe. As invasions by European countries have been tried before, all failed due to the vast distances and Russian winters. From Napoleon to Hitler. (In Wikipedia I found a total of 8 invasions coming from their western side, since 1571)

As Russia does not have the economy to outspend NATO on Defense matters, they need to protect that advantage of distance.

The EU/US has been, since the fall of the Soviet Union quite belligerent (figuratively) in expanding itself and/or NATO eastwards, therefore removing step by step the distance advantage of Russia. With Ukraine, Putin drew a line, as this would
A. Allow Ukraine to become NATO, and thus have rockets at only a few 100 Km from the Kremlin.
B. Compromise their access to the Black Sea, and thus the Mediterranean Sea, their southern maritime access, when the northern one freezes over in part in the winter.

It makes total sense for Russia to say stop. The US said the same thing when Cuba happened.

But I do also fully agree with @Red Leg ‘s comment where you say that it is a generational problem. Too many people in power today were in the trenches (figuratively) during the Cold War. It will require a new generation to have the hotheadedness cool down a bit.

Now, as far as I know, there are no ideas for the conquest of Russia (and, to a heap, China). But there is the doctrine of Prompt Global Strike, PGS - an unexpected disarming strike with conventional weapons that can disable Russian strategic forces. Then you can do whatever you want - there are examples of reprisals against non-nuclear countries.
Now a technical opportunity is being formed for the implementation of this doctrine - hypersonic missiles with a speed of, say, 5 miles per second. There are not so many targets for such a strike - units of submarines with missiles - they usually stand in ports in Murmansk and Petropavlovsk, 2-3 airfields of strategic bombers, and several hundred silos and mobile ground missiles. If you combine such a strike using an Aegis-type system that will shoot down the remaining launched missiles, then this can happen. A dagger strike at close range is desirable for success. In this direction, perhaps, the desire of the United States to Eastern Europe and Central Asia is being considered. Hypersonic missiles from the current bases in Poland and Romania will be able to fly in 7 minutes.
But if something does not work out, then the consequences will be clear, and for the United States, and not only for Europe and Japan.
The second option is a war like the Crimean war of 1853-56 or the Russian-Japanese war, on the periphery of Russia and with conventional weapons. The exclave, the Kaliningrad Region, is considered particularly vulnerable, which, in principle, can be occupied by the available composition of NATO troops on duty, without mobilization. Or maybe not occupied. The benefit of such an option is that there is no nuclear war, and in case of failure, the US territory does not suffer, and no one cares about Europe ("Fuck EU!") (c) (Victoria Nuland).
There is also a third option, so to speak, "vaccine lite" - an attack on the clientele of Russia by type 08.08.08. For example, on the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic. But there are three battalions of Russian peacekeepers there, and there will be an ata-ta for attacking them. It is in this case, it seems to me, that the invasion of Russian troops is possible, not into Ukraine, but through Ukraine. On the other hand, this conflict is not very likely, because the existence of the PMR is paradoxically beneficial to Ukraine.
As for GDP, it is not necessary to absolutize it. This is a calculated indicator, and nothing more, it does not take into account physical volumes, but only prices. I read from a crazy Democrat from Florida, and there are desperate fans of Chinese communists among American Democrats, that if the Chinese bank changes the yuan exchange rate three times, then China's GDP will grow three times, and Chinese workers will become highly paid, and this will have little effect on the state and even the competitiveness of the Chinese economy. And there is some rational grain in this.
Of course, all this does not mean that Russia cannot suffer a military defeat. There are no invincibles, everything happens in war.

 

[VertigoBE]

Now, as far as I know, there are no ideas for the conquest of Russia (and, to a heap, China). But there is the doctrine of Prompt Global Strike, PGS - an unexpected disarming strike with conventional weapons that can disable Russian strategic forces. Then you can do whatever you want - there are examples of reprisals against non-nuclear countries.
Now a technical opportunity is being formed for the implementation of this doctrine - hypersonic missiles with a speed of, say, 5 miles per second. There are not so many targets for such a strike - units of submarines with missiles - they usually stand in ports in Murmansk and Petropavlovsk, 2-3 airfields of strategic bombers, and several hundred silos and mobile ground missiles. If you combine such a strike using an Aegis-type system that will shoot down the remaining launched missiles, then this can happen. A dagger strike at close range is desirable for success. In this direction, perhaps, the desire of the United States to Eastern Europe and Central Asia is being considered. Hypersonic missiles from the current bases in Poland and Romania will be able to fly in 7 minutes.
But if something does not work out, then the consequences will be clear, and for the United States, and not only for Europe and Japan.
The second option is a war like the Crimean war of 1853-56 or the Russian-Japanese war, on the periphery of Russia and with conventional weapons. The exclave, the Kaliningrad Region, is considered particularly vulnerable, which, in principle, can be occupied by the available composition of NATO troops on duty, without mobilization. Or maybe not occupied. The benefit of such an option is that there is no nuclear war, and in case of failure, the US territory does not suffer, and no one cares about Europe ("Fuck EU!") (c) (Victoria Nuland).
There is also a third option, so to speak, "vaccine lite" - an attack on the clientele of Russia by type 08.08.08. For example, on the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic. But there are three battalions of Russian peacekeepers there, and there will be an ata-ta for attacking them. It is in this case, it seems to me, that the invasion of Russian troops is possible, not into Ukraine, but through Ukraine. On the other hand, this conflict is not very likely, because the existence of the PMR is paradoxically beneficial to Ukraine.
As for GDP, it is not necessary to absolutize it. This is a calculated indicator, and nothing more, it does not take into account physical volumes, but only prices. I read from a crazy Democrat from Florida, and there are desperate fans of Chinese communists among American Democrats, that if the Chinese bank changes the yuan exchange rate three times, then China's GDP will grow three times, and Chinese workers will become highly paid, and this will have little effect on the state and even the competitiveness of the Chinese economy. And there is some rational grain in this.
Of course, all this does not mean that Russia cannot suffer a military defeat. There are no invincibles, everything happens in war.

I should maybe have been a bit more clear in my reasoning concerning the thirst for distance by Russia. Obviously they are not fearing a humdrum coalition of 20 different EU nations sending tanks towards Moscow. (That would however be a funny sight (dark humor), with most of the EU equipment breaking down before even reaching their own countries borders.)

I wanted to point out instead that this thirst for space in this day and age is related to the positioning of offensive and counteroffensive missile technology. MAD works, as long as neither side can have a distinct advantage over the other. Having offensive or counteroffensive measures so close to the Kremlin would be such a distinct advantage, therefore upsetting the balance found in MAD.

And “invasion” is also in my opinion a large word to use, if we consider that the most eastern provinces of Ukraine are primarily Russian speaking, have a Russian culture and I suspect, would not be overly against becoming part of Russia again. Meanwhile Russia would obtain a direct land corridor towards the Crimea, for which they have bled plenty in the past.

Something I cooked up for a recent market analysis session.

 

[Red Leg]

I am confident that no one is going to invade Russia - unless it is China attempting to reclaim territory in the East. Neither the US, nor the EU, nor NATO is going to launch a ground war against Russia. Ever. Even at the height of the Cold War, NATO's war planning was purely defensive. We never even exercised war plans to restore Germany's territorial integrity through a counter attack. Due to the conventional force differential - hugely in the USSR's favor - we did anticipate having to resort to tactical nuclear weapons. One should assume Russia would also use tactical nuclear weapons to protect its sovereignty were forces of sufficient strength to conduct a land offensive ever massed on its borders. Only once the A-10, Apache, Bradley, and M1 Abrams were fielded did the US Army have an adequate qualitative advantage to make military assumptions that a conventional attack could be halted with conventional forces. I doubt that Russia would be comfortable making that assumption currently.

Russia today, like the US during the Cold War, remains somewhat obsessed with "first strike" capability. It is why we were so concerned about USSR's mobile MRV platforms that were essentially immune from retaliation. It is also why we have retained our submarine based retaliatory capability at a high level since the Cold War. It remains a final trump card should an adversary contemplate a first strike against the US.

I appreciate @Vasper's thoughts concerning current first strike capability or a limited war scenario. It illustrates the vast gulf in perception that can potentially exist between nation states. First, the US does not yet have an operational hypersonic missile. The US Army will likely be the first to field a unit, and that will be in a couple of years. It is planned as a conventional weapon. The US Army demobilized its tactical nuclear weapons during the George Bush administration. The Navy weapon will follow it. It will also be conventional and is designed as a ship killer and for pin-point attack like the current cruise missile systems. Their advantage is that they are far harder to intercept. But the mission set remains essentially the same as the Tomahawk and ATCMS but with greater range and higher likelihood of penetrating air defense systems.

The last time the US had any active planning for a limited incursion into Russia was 1917. We have had no intention or war meaningful planning to return since then - even during the Cold War. And no one, other than perhaps a few geriatric German dead enders, has any interest in restoring East Prussia and Konnigsburg (Kaliningrad).

Of course none of that actually addresses Russia's security concerns. It also doesn't address what I (an American perspective) believe is Russia's primary strategic goal, which is to reclaim land access to the Crimea and the Black Sea. That is a strategic goal solved by the USSR, but threatened by an independent Ukraine. It is national interest based upon generations of history. Moreover, I suspect a plebiscite held in just the Eastern third of Ukraine would support reintegration with Russia. Such issues need to be addressed. As both the Sudetenland and Danzig corridor demonstrate, such issues can escalate quickly and uncontrollably.

The problem with acting on that understanding is that it obviates the right of national self-determination.

Unlike most of the rest of Eastern Europe, Ukraine's situation is more complex. Western leadership needs to fully understand the cascading effects of that complexity. Unlike the Poles for instance, the Ukraine has never really exercised what we would call in the modern sense, national self-determination. The closest parallel that I can think of is non-existent "Kurdistan." The contiguous Kurdish "homeland" is located within the borders of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Hope for achieving national asperations were why the Kurds were so supportive of US activity in Iraq. Unfortunately, those asperations will remain frustrated for the foreseeable future.

But with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine saw its opportunity to finally achieve those asperations. Kurdistan was a victim of British arbitrary map making. Ukraine is in some ways a victim of Soviet cartography. The Eastern quarter of the country probably should never have been included in the Soviet Republic of Ukraine. It was. How that is resolved, is I believe, the key strategic issue.

I assume it is a matter of intense discussion, if only because our flailing president seemed to let it leak during his recent press conference.

I look forward to @Vasper's thoughts.

 

[Vashper]

You see, it seems that MAD is no longer regarded as the main guiding doctrine, and this is the danger (from the Russian point of view). In Russia, it probably admits, for physical reasons, but I'm not competent. The Russian leadership is traditionally reactionary and conservative, and does not want to remake the world on an ethnic basis. In my opinion, it is inclined to the principles of the Westphalian system, which is based on the principles of:

priority of national interests;
the principle of balance of power;
priority of the nation—States;
the principle of State sovereignty;
the right to demand non-interference in their own affairs;
equality of rights of States;
obligation to fulfill signed contracts;
the principle of operation of international law and the application of diplomacy in international relations .

These principles are in conflict with the "right of nations to self-determination" (a nation is not equal to a state-a nation, well, you, as a Belgian, know this).

Therefore, it did not support either the Serbian enclaves in the non-Serbian republics in Yugoslavia, or the allocation of Kosovo.
Actually, the current states are not ethnic, for example, the majority of Ukrainian politicians are not ethnic Ukrainians.

 

[mark-hunter]

As a side note, the comment on ethic and state border situation in recent Balcans wars I find very illustrative, and I wanted to mention it myself, but Vashper has beat me to it. There are many similarities.