You make a lot of good points and I wish I had time to discuss them all with you. I will just focus down onto a couple.
One of your points, about not being allowed to criticize things, or "the enemy is here and we're not allowed to point a finger at it, speak against it, bully it, fight it, restrain it, or imprison it." Is a domestic political problem, not a military problem. You can't bomb your way out of that problem. You need to change your domestic politics if you believe those things to be true. In fact I think the United States does a lot of that work, by declaring various organizations as terrorist, or deporting people with radical ideologies etc. But sinking Iranian ships or invading a country won't solve those problems at home. Building a united nation, speaking and standing as one both against what it abhors, and in favour of what it admires is a very tough job. It can be done, but building that coalition is hard, and they don't tend to last too long.
And no matter how you change your view of risk or peril, the idea of civilians, or people who should not be targeted is baked into democracy and civilized countries. We don't punish people for having bad thoughts or not liking our way of life. Freedom of thought and freedom of expression is important, particularly when you disagree with what is being said.
One of the great sentiments of a constitutional democracy is "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it."
So, if you like, you could break down the categories of people who you could target into more categories of the sake of discussion:
1). People engaged in hostility against us (combatants)
2) People sympathetic to, or supportive of group 1) (civilians)
3) People who don't really care either way (civilians)
4) People who are sympathic to, or supportive of, our side (civilians)
If you decide to fundamentally change the rules and make group 2) legitimate military targets, you have abandoned the concepts of freedom of thought and freedom of speech, and you are asking your military to distinguish between group 2) and 3), a very difficult task in the real world.
And when you abandon your democratic principles like that you are now just asking young men to kill and die to make sure the rich and powerful stay rich and powerful, rather than to strive and sacrifice for noble principles. That is not my vision for a democratic nation. I hope the United States never sinks that low. I kind of like it when they at least try to be the House on the Hill.
Lastly I would argue that eliminating the distinction between military and civilian lengths hostility rather than shortens it, in the big picture. When you staring blowing up women and children etc you build generations of hate at a very primal level. Which is one of the reasons that the Israeli Palestinian conflict seems so intractable.
You both have left out a segment of the population that absolutely was "targeted" during the second world war - and primarily by the allies. These were the workers and their families that made up the industrial base as much as did the factories and machinery involved in war production. In fact, I would argue this target set was the heart of the strategic bombing campaign by the RAF against Germany and the US strategic air campaign against Japan.
In both Europe and against Japan the most destructive if not necessarily most effective tactical choice was firebombing during the ours of darkness. The first actual firestorm was created by the RAF in 1943 with the bombing of Hamburg. Large HE bombs were used to demolish buildings and destroy water mains which were followed by thousands of incendiary bomblets. These thousands of small fires quickly combined into a single firestorm that killed 40,000 people. The primary targeted area for the RAF were the residential areas adjacent to Hamburg's vast ship yards to eliminate the yards' supporting workforce. Naturally that included the families of those workers as well. The firestorm also tore the heart of the city and its civic infrastructure. Over a million people were left homeless. Other German cities such as Kassel. Darmstadt, and of course Dresden suffered similar fates.
In the Pacific, the US adopted a similar strategic doctrine with respect to Japan which had an extremely diversified industrial base scattered throughout major cities. US B-29 Super fortresses were stripped of all their defensive armament to increase speed and payload and were sent in relatively low level raids dropping hundreds of thousands of small incendiary bombs. 67 cities were struck with such raids and the level of destruction and casualties far surpassed the effects of the two atomic weapons which ended the war. For instance, during the raid in March, 80-100 thousand people were killed and another million plus made homeless. Half of Tokyo was burned to the ground.
Is such targeting a legitimate or "legal" strategy? I suppose it depends on the eye of the beholder. Certainly British leadership decided it had done enough after seeing the effects of the Dresden raid. The US continued its attacks to the collapse of the Japanese war effort with the two atomic weapons.
A debate has been waged by three generations of historians since the war as to the effectiveness of such a strategy. In no instance was the will of the German or Japanese people to wage war broken. As to the effectiveness of the destruction of the industrial base, Germany, under Albert Speer, was able to actually increase military armaments production through the summer of 1944 at which point it was more than twice higher than it was in 1942.
After a lot of debate, the US decided to move toward precision strikes in the decades following the war. That was the largely forlorn hope of the US 8th Air Force over Europe where technology did not yet match aspirations. I believe the question is still open to debate whether are not such strikes represent a war winning strategy. To date, and it is a cautionary note for our efforts over Iran, no war has been one by bombardment from the air - precision or area.
With respect to the targets themselves, the means of production, transport infrastructure, and the economic foundation of any belligerent will be the core of any strategic bombardment campaign. Those would be included in any target set of a general nuclear exchange between this country and any other nuclear capable foe, and none of the leadership of any of the belligerents would care an iota about the musings of an international court.
With respect to Iran and with the exception of the initial decapitation strikes, we have thus far carried out operational rather than strategic strikes. Normally such strikes are initiated to prepare the battle space for subsequent strategic action to end the conflict. This was done in both the Gulf War and the initial invasion of Iraq, both of which were successful in driving Iraqi forces from Kuwait and taking down the Baathist regime in Iraq respectively.
We will see if the operational campaign currently being waged is effective enough to force a settlement sufficiently in our favor to consider it "victory." I have my doubts. What this campaign can achieve is sufficient destruction of Iran's war making and nuclear programs to eliminate them as a regional threat for a meaningful period of time. Though that will be difficult to prove to the electorate and will leave Iran able to claim victory in withstanding the best efforts of the Great Satan. Perhaps there is a level of wisdom to Israel's retaliatory strategy with respect to Hamas. The WWII generation would certainly see no issue with it.