Politics

[Vashper]

Cage armors (typically on the sides of less armored vehicles) still work with older generation, shoulder-fired weapons like the ubiquitous RPG7, of which it seems there are still tens or hundreds of thousands out there, because they have a single, and much smaller warhead.

RPG7 has now tandem warhead too

 

[Vashper]

One big difference and the US President has nothing to do with it. If Iraq also had a multitude of nuclear weapons aimed at Europe and the US, I very much doubt we would have gone in.

I think it's not just that. If the first war against Iraq was supported by many countries, including Syria and Russia, the second was waged by the United States and Britain. Even France refused to participate. And now the situation is ambiguous. If the Emirates and the Houthis refused to condemn Russia, who are actually fighting among themselves...
And militarily - technically, yes, as far as I understand the situation, the Russian leadership hopes to withstand a military conflict against NATO at any level of escalation.

 

[Vashper]

Fact Check @Vashper - Please provide chapter and verse, or is it just a joke for the irreligious?

It's just a joke (it's allowed in our society). If you read the Bible (Genesis 2-4), you will easily find out that there is nothing like that there. The Lord simply put Adam in front of the fact, as it usually happens in life.
There is nothing written about democracy there either, don't look for it.

 

[Tanks]

...
And militarily - technically, yes, as far as I understand the situation, the Russian leadership hopes to withstand a military conflict against NATO at any level of escalation.

Well, a nuclear deterrent is worthless if one is not willing to use it.

 

[Ray B]

It's just a joke (it's allowed in our society).

I suspect that in the next edition of Webster's dictionary that if you look-up Joke, it will have a picture of the current US president.

 

[One Day...]

I actually like the article posted by Von Gruff

Ukraine Update--The Russian Offensive | The Gateway Pundit | by Larry Johnson

Rob Schmitt on Newsmax on the Russian invasion of Ukraine (The following is from Patrick Armstrong.

www.thegatewaypundit.com

That is the most tortured explanation or spin of Russian tactical inertia I have yet read. Calling this a reconnaissance in force is one of the most abusive uses of a military term I have ever seen.

Russia may very well force a favorable conclusion to this conflict. But I see little evidence the current battle was envisioned when hostilities commenced.

Well, I agree that the term "reconnaissance in force" is inaccurate, and that, in general, the first paragraph is inaccurate in as much as it may have described the first day or two of the war, but by day 10 (this was published today March 5), operations cannot be surmised as just locating Ukrainian forces are, surrounding them, checking intelligence, and destroying headquarters, weapons and depots.

This being said, I must say that I completely agree with the second paragraph, which essentially says exactly the same thing I had previously analyzed:

...

3) My fear is that the convoy has not run out of fuel; that the Ukrainians are incapable of destroying it from the air; and that the hundreds of Javelins and TOWs that would be required to destroy it on the ground are not in the hands of ground troops qualified to use them.​

I analyze this convoy as Putin clear message to Ukraine/EU/US/NATO: "Look, I have the military capability to unleash on Kyiv what I did on Grozny, and you can do nothing about it, so let's discuss how we end this".​

...

Something is not computing...
...
What is it in there that we are not understanding? And that we better start to understand quick before we get completely rolled in this maskirovka (Russian military deception doctrine), if it is one indeed.
...

I also agree with the analysis of the sanctions, which essentially says the same thing I had previously analyzed:

• Russia currently continues to be paid in dollars, and dollars continue for the time being, and into at least the near-term future, to be THE currency of reference through the world.
• As long as EU and US need the Russian gas and oil, Putin will continue to have an incredibly strong leverage on the EU and US.
• The current market prices for gas and oil not only fund the Russian war in Ukraine (executed quite cheaply so far) but can likely also fund some of the continuing modernization of the Russian military, and float the Russian economy, as long as the markets remain at their current level, and as long as the US continue to self-defeat with an energy policy that defies my understanding of common sense ...

As to the outcome, I also totally agree:

As to the solution to the overall situation, I would personally see it quite similarly to what Kissinger and Brzezinski were recommending from 2000 to 2008. Some sort of "Finlandization" of Ukraine and Belarus in a first step...

It may be that those of us who think this way have tortured minds and it may be that Patrick Armstrong, analyst in the Canadian Department of National Defence and former Counsellor in the Canadian Embassy in Moscow is engaged in spinning , but I know that I have no spin purpose and that I only advocate on behalf of an objective analysis of the situation, however unsavory the actor maybe

Two hypotheses

Be all the above as it may, we have two clear hypotheses:

1- One is that Russia forces have failed to acquire air superiority; have unfolded an unprecedented series of incredible tactical blunders - including the 40 mile convoy running out of fuel; have displayed complete ineptitude; have fought themselves to a standstill; do not have a graduate level understanding of force projection; and that their total victory is more unlikely with every passing hour.​

​

2- The other is that, in words I used before in previous posts, Putin is engaged in soviet-style coercive diplomacy using military brute force and naked aggression to strengthen the negotiation of his "security demands", and will continue to progressively up the ante on the battlefield until a negotiated settlement is reached. Sadly, Kyiv is the hostage with a gun to its head in this blackmail, and I have no doubt that Russian forces can and will take and/or level Kyiv pretty much anytime Putin decides so, which can only be avoided at this stage by Zelenskyy agreeing to a settlement acceptable to Putin.​

I currently exclude other hypotheses such as military intervention in Ukraine by NATO; attack by Russia of a NATO country (an unplanned border incident is always possible); use of theatre or strategic nuclear weapons; etc. and while a coup in Russia is always possible, I give this one an extremely low probability.

Therefore, one of the above two hypotheses will likely prove right:

Either no negotiated settlement is reached, and the war essentially becomes a static trench war on currently achieved positions, in which case the first hypothesis was correct;​

or:

A negotiated settlement along the lines of some form of neutralization is reached, hopefully before the Russian army engages in a full fledge siege/battle of Kyiv.​

We shall see...

I shall be the first to acknowledge if my analysis turns out to be wrong...

 

[CoElkHunter]

This video (which is not related to current operations in Ukraine) explains very well how the Javelin (and air dropped, top-down weapons) work, and why the cage protection is not only unlikely to defeat them, but may actually increase their penetration capability (although it is not needed on top armor as mentioned by Red Leg) by creating a stand off detonation.

Not to mention the fact that all modern weapons have a tandem warhead with a first warhead designed to defeat the protection, and the second, main warhead designed to defeat the armor.

Cage armors (typically on the sides of less armored vehicles) still work with older generation, shoulder-fired weapons like the ubiquitous RPG7, of which it seems there are still tens or hundreds of thousands out there, because they have a single, and much smaller warhead.

Are Javelins and Stingers reloadable in the field?

 

[Ray B]

I still think that the US can bargain with Russia. The bargain i: the US is going back to Trump policy regarding exploration, development and transport of oil & LNG, including pipelines to Europe and Africa which among other things will reduce the price of oil to about $25. In addition the US will review it's budget and install a plan to reduce the deficit to maintain liquidity of the US $.

In other words Mr Putin, if you want to bankrupt your country just keep doing what you're doing in Ukraine. Of course, be prepared for your trial for war crimes when the dust has settled.

 

[Tanks]

Are Javelins and Stingers reloadable in the field?

The missiles themselves obviously are not. However, the Javelin launchers can be reloaded.

 

[Tanks]

I still think that the US can bargain with Russia. The bargain i: the US is going back to Trump policy regarding exploration, development and transport of oil & LNG, including pipelines to Europe and Africa which among other things will reduce the price of oil to about $25.

Not going to happen. Current logic of the Democrats is to double down on renewable sources of energy as this shows the fallacy of being dependent on fossil fuels (they said it, not me).

In addition the US will review it's budget and install a plan to reduce the deficit to maintain liquidity of the US $.

Also, Democrats are on the record of not worrying about the deficit and consider it to be a pretty low percentage of GDP and still wanting to spend trillions.

 

[One Day...]

Are Javelins and Stingers reloadable in the field?

The Stinger has an integral sighting system permanently attached to its launch tube. The sighting system is not "reloadable". However, it also has a separate grip/stock launcher assembly that is "reloadable".

The Javelin is a two-component system that includes a Command Launch Unit on which tubed missiles can be attached. It is therefore "reloadable".

 

[Ray B]

@Tanks - I know, you're preaching to the choir. I was just saying that it would be a solution that Putin would understand, and could result in a peaceful resolution. I know the DemonRats will have nothing to do with it or reality for that matter.

 

[Vashper]

I'm afraid the prospects for a peace agreement are getting dim. In Kiev, security officers publicly executed one of the members of the Ukrainian delegation at the talks, Kireev. "For treason." It also turned out that Kireev was an employee of military intelligence.
It is unlikely that Zelensky will sign the peace in these conditions.

 

[Red Leg]

I actually like the article posted by Von Gruff

Ukraine Update--The Russian Offensive | The Gateway Pundit | by Larry Johnson

Rob Schmitt on Newsmax on the Russian invasion of Ukraine (The following is from Patrick Armstrong.

www.thegatewaypundit.com

Well, I agree that the term "reconnaissance in force" is inaccurate, and that, in general the first paragraph is inaccurate in as much as it may have described the first day or two of the war, but by day 10 (this was written today March 5), operations cannot be surmised as just locating Ukrainian forces are, surrounding them, checking intelligence, and destroying headquarters, weapons and depots.

View attachment 455806

This being said, I must say that I completely agree with the second paragraph, which essentially says exactly the same thing I had previously analyzed:

View attachment 455813

My last posts on the subject were:





I also agree with the analysis of the sanctions, which essentially says the same thing I had previously analyzed:

View attachment 455815


As to the outcome:

View attachment 455816

I also totally agree:


It may be that those of us who think this way have tortured minds, and it may be that Patrick Armstrong, analyst in the Canadian Department of National Defence and former Counsellor in the Canadian Embassy in Moscow is engaged in spinning, but I know that I have no spin purpose and that I only advocate on behalf of an objective analysis of the situation.

Two hypotheses

Be all the above as it may, we have two clear hypotheses:

1- One is that Russia forces have failed to acquire air superiority; have unfolded an unprecedented series of incredible tactical blunders - including the 40 mile convoy running out of fuel; have displayed complete ineptitude; have fought themselves to a standstill; and that their total victory is more unlikely with every passing hour.​

​

2- The other is that, in words I used before in previous posts, Putin is engaged in soviet-style coercive diplomacy using military brute force and naked aggression to strengthen the negotiation of his security demands, and will continue tp progressively up the ante on the battlefield until a negotiated settlement is reached. Sadly, Kyiv is the hostage with a gun to its head in the blackmail, and I have no doubt that Russian forces can take and/or level it pretty much anytime Putin decides so, which can only be avoided at this stage by Zelenskyy agreeing to a settlement acceptable to Putin.​

One of this hypotheses will prove right:

Either no negotiated settlement is reached, and the war essentially becomes a static trench war on currently achieved positions, in which case the first hypothesis was correct;​

or:

A negotiated settlement along the lines of some form of neutralization is reached, hopefully before the Russian army engages in a full fledge siege/battle of Kyiv.​

We shall see...

I thought you would agree with much of it.

I would only note that Mr. Armstrong was one of the loudest voices ridiculing the "hysteria" (his word) about a possible Russian invasion of the Ukraine. His last such post was February 14, 2022. Now he is also apparently a military expert, though struggling with that whole military terminology thing. I don't know if he is more an apologist for the Kremlin or merely mesmerized.

If a negotiated settlement is reached within the bounds we have been discussing, it is because the Russian military has determined it either can not achieve its objectives or because they (or perhaps Putin) has determined that achieving those objectives is no longer worth the cost. Otherwise, they would proceed with outcome B.

That other alternative is a dictat imposed by Russian arms. The only question is if that dictat only encompasses land east of the Dnieper or the whole country. I think the latter is extremely unlikely, and the jury is still very much out with regard to the former.

The second echelon force in the Northwest is not only stalled, but also appears to be suffering significant losses due to continuing Ukrainian attacks. The Russians are enjoying some success with a new axis of advance toward Kiev from the northeast, but that may also be because the Ukrainians have yet to focus combat power against it.

There is considerable evidence being reported by US military authorities, that the Russians have begun transferring units from the Russian Far East. It would strike most analysts as an unusual action were a campaign going so brilliantly to plan.

The Russians are indeed making some progress in the South. There seems to be indications that they have decided to now make that their main effort, with the seizure of nuclear plants as potential bargaining chips to use against the West (or perhaps protect them from those suicidal and dastardly Ukrainians). The large military infrastructure in Crimea seems to be fueling this effort. It is worth remembering though the Russian's apparent ineptitude at force protection in the north. Every kilometer gained in the south will put pressure on these new supply lines.

War reserve (that means NATO force quality) MANPADS, NLAWS, and Javelins seem to have begun arriving on the battlefield in quantity around 48 hours ago. These are extremely lethal systems. US trainers were in the Ukraine from 2018 until just before hostilities. There is large cadre of Ukrainians well versed in the use of these weapons. Anything flying below 20,000 feet or rolling on tracks in the open is at risk.

No, I think this has become a war of attrition and will. Russia owns a trump card with the capability to inflict massive civilian casualties. And though Zelensky's pleas have gone unheeded to date, thousands of civilian casualties may indeed force NATO's hand.

My sense is the issue is still very much in doubt.

 

[One Day...]

I'm afraid the prospects for a peace agreement are getting dim. In Kiev, security officers publicly executed one of the members of the Ukrainian delegation at the talks, Kireev. "For treason." It also turned out that Kireev was an employee of military intelligence.
It is unlikely that Zelensky will sign the peace in these conditions.

Correct, but not because of his role in the negotiations.
He was executed because the SBU concluded that he was a spy.
I have no data to have an opinion as to whether this is true or false, but his execution is not linked to the negotiations, and I am not sure that it has any bearing on the negotiations.

 

[John Wasmuth]

The right side is pretty much the same when all they hear is their own echo chamber. At this time the USA is very much divided with neither side of the political spectrum trusting each other and expecting the worst.

Truth.

 

[One Day...]

I thought you would agree with much of it.

I would only note that Mr. Armstrong was one of the loudest voices ridiculing the "hysteria" (his word) about a possible Russian invasion of the Ukraine. His last such post was February 14, 2022. Now he is also apparently a military expert, though struggling with that whole military terminology thing. I don't know if he is more an apologist for the Kremlin or merely mesmerized.

If a negotiated settlement is reached within the bounds we have been discussing, it is because the Russian military has determined it either can not achieve its objectives or because they (or perhaps Putin) has determined that achieving those objectives is no longer worth the cost. Otherwise, they would proceed with outcome B.

That other alternative is a dictat imposed by Russian arms. The only question is if that dictat only encompasses land east of the Dnieper or the whole country. I think the latter is extremely unlikely, and the jury is still very much out with regard to the former.

The second echelon force in the Northwest is not only stalled, but also appears to be suffering significant losses due to continuing Ukrainian attacks. The Russians are enjoying some success with a new axis of advance toward Kiev from the northeast, but that may also be because the Ukrainians have yet to focus combat power against it.

There is considerable evidence being reported by US military authorities, that the Russians have begun transferring units from the Russian Far East. It would strike most analysts as an unusual action were a campaign going so brilliantly to plan.

The Russians are indeed making some progress in the South. There seems to be indications that they have decided to now make that their main effort, with the seizure of nuclear plants as potential bargaining chips to use against the West (or perhaps protect them from those suicidal and dastardly Ukrainians). The large military infrastructure in Crimea seems to be fueling this effort. It is worth remembering though the Russian's apparent ineptitude at force protection in the north. Every kilometer gained in the south will put pressure on these new supply lines.

War reserve (that means NATO force quality) MANPADS, NLAWS, and Javelins seem to have begun arriving on the battlefield in quantity around 48 hours ago. These are extremely lethal systems. US trainers were in the Ukraine from 2018 until just before hostilities. There is large cadre of Ukrainians well versed in the use of these weapons. Anything flying below 20,000 feet or rolling on tracks in the open is at risk.

No, I think this has become a war of attrition and will. Russia owns a trump card with the capability to inflict massive civilian casualties. And though Zelensky's pleas have gone unheeded to date, thousands of civilian casualties may indeed force NATO's hand.

My sense is the issue is still very much in doubt.

I hear you, and I always consider carefully what you write, and whether we agree or disagree on an aspect of the analysis (there are many aspects on which we agree), I certainly respect you as a person, I respect your perspective, and recognize that your military experience is both much more recent, and obviously much more accomplished than my very modest one.

In your last post, I have a different view regarding your second paragraph.

In my analysis you are proposing only one of two alternatives:

"If a negotiated settlement is reached within the bounds we have been discussing, it is because the Russian military has determined it either can not achieve its objectives or because they (or perhaps Putin) has determined that achieving those objectives is no longer worth the cost. Otherwise, they would proceed with outcome B."​

The second alternative why a negotiated settlement can be reached within the bounds we have been discussing (which I assume you mean some form of neutralization, or "Finlandization", using the more dated language I was more familiar with in my military days) would be:

"If a negotiated settlement is reached within the bounds we have been discussing, it is because the Ukrainians have determined they either cannot stop the Russians from achieving their objectives or because they have determined that preventing them from achieving those objectives is not worth the cost."​

The weakness of the alternative you advance, is that it take two sides to agree to a negotiated settlement, and I am not sure Zelenskyy would agree to Russian "security demands" if he negotiates from a position of strength.

This being said, and despite Putin's likely maskirovka in stating to French President Macron his intent to grab all of Ukraine, I agree that it is "extremely unlikely".

I think we both agree that:

• Ukraine/EU/US/NATO/the West have already accepted - even if not in public statements for internal politics consumption - the foreign politic inevitability of Crimea being Russian due to its 90%+ Russophone population and - most importantly - Sevastopol;
• EU/US/NATO/the West have long accepted that the entry of Ukraine (we can add Georgia and Belarus) into NATO is not a realistic prospect at this stage, and that even if the US accepted it, France and Germany would veto it, as they already did in 2008;
• the Donbass is more a liability to Ukraine/EU/US/NATO/the West than an asset, and ending the ethnic disintegration cancer in Ukraine is well worth the cost of letting it re-attach itself to Russia;
• Crimea + the Donbass + neutralization/Finlandization of Ukraine and non-entry in NATO can allow Putin to claim victory at home, while Ukraine's entry in the EU can allow the West to also claim its own victory.

In the end, and to a point, who cares whether we get to a negotiated acknowledgment and settlement along the above lines because the Russians realize they cannot crush Ukraine, or because the Ukrainians realize the Russians can crush them!

This is of intellectual interest to us, and my evaluation is that we EACH provide worthy arguments supporting our hypothesis, but in the end, all that matters is that this thing ends before Grozny 2.0 or another 14 years of Donbass 2.0 on steroids.

 

[Red Leg]

I hear you, and I always consider carefully what you write, and whether we agree or disagree on an aspect of the analysis (there are many aspects on which we agree), I certainly respect your perspective, and recognize that your military experience is both much more recent, and obviously much more accomplished than my very modest one.

In your last post, I have a different view regarding your second paragraph.

In my analysis you are proposing only one of two alternatives:

"If a negotiated settlement is reached within the bounds we have been discussing, it is because the Russian military has determined it either can not achieve its objectives or because they (or perhaps Putin) has determined that achieving those objectives is no longer worth the cost. Otherwise, they would proceed with outcome B."​

The second alternative why a negotiated settlement can be reached within the bounds we have been discussing (which I assume you mean some form of neutralization, or "Finlandization", using the more dated language I was more familiar with in my military days) would be:

"If a negotiated settlement is reached within the bounds we have been discussing, it is because the Ukrainians have determined they either cannot stop the Russians from achieving their objectives or because they have determined that preventing them from achieving those objectives is not worth the cost."​

The weakness of the alternative you advance, is that it take two sides to agree to a negotiated settlement, and I am not sure Zelenskyy would agree to Russian "security demands" if he negotiates from a position of strength.

This being said, and despite Putin's likely maskirovka in stating to French President Macron his intent to grab all of Ukraine, I agree that it is "extremely unlikely".

I think we both agree that:

• Ukraine/EU/US/NATO/the West have already accepted - even if not in public statements for internal politics consumption - the foreign politic inevitability of Crimea being Russian due to its 90%+ Russophone population and - most importantly - Sevastopol;
• EU/US/NATO/the West have long accepted that the entry of Ukraine (we can add Georgia and Belarus) into NATO is not a realistic prospect at this stage, and that even if the US accepted it, France and Germany would veto it, as they already did in 2008;
• the Donbass is more a liability to Ukraine/EU/US/NATO/the West than an asset, and ending the ethnic disintegration cancer in Ukraine is well worth the cost of letting it re-attach itself to Russia;
• Crimea + the Donbass + neutralization/Finlandization of Ukraine and non-entry in NATO can allow Putin to claim victory, while Ukraine entry in the EU can allow the West to also claim its own victory.

In the end, and to a point, who cares whether we get to a negotiated acknowledgment and settlement along the above lines because the Russian realize they cannot crush Ukraine, or because the Ukrainians realize the Russians can crush them!

This is of intellectual interest to us, and my evaluation is that we EACH provide worthy argument supporting our hypothesis, but in the end, all that matters is that this thing ends before Grozny 2.0 or another 14 years of Donbass 2.0 on steroids.

I think we agree pretty closely on that outcome scenario would make the most sense should Russian military "victory" prove too difficult or impossible.

 

[Red Leg]

Right, if I understand it correctly, the missile adjusts its movements as it tracks the target, but on firing the missile has a "lead" built into it's path and the adjustments would be a result of the target changing from it's initial direction/speed. So if the target had a steady direction & speed the missile would follow a straight line.

Rockets have come a long way since my days with the 3.5" rocket launcher.

A way to visualize it is to stand with a fifty foot length of garden hose held in your left hand in a straight line at ninety degrees to the direction you are facing. Take ten steps forward and look at the path of the hose. That would be the flight of a missile with a homing seeker fired a 90 degree deflection.

 

[One Day...]

I think we agree pretty closely on that outcome scenario would make the most sense should Russian military "victory" prove too difficult or impossible.

Leaving aside which of the two alternatives can get Putin and Zelenskyy to a negotiated settlement per above posts , at the strategic level I would re-iterate one of my previous posts that I believe Russia's war victory impossible, even if they were to prevail on the battlefield (military victory).

Putin has already done such irreparable harm to Russia and to himself, that however this thing ends, all he can hope for is a face-saving settlement (which may indeed include most if not all his initial "security demands"), but this will be a Pyrrhic victory. The national and personal costs/pain are without proportion to the benefits/gain.