



MARKETING

WILDLIFE

LEASES

WILDLIFE MANAGEMENT SERIES



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These guideline booklets are based on field experience and original research reports which are available from the WWF Programme Office in Harare. WWF wishes to acknowledge the important contribution made by the Rural District Councils and their constituent communities in the development of the series.

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Illustration, design and production: **Action**



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The selection process for safari operators for Guruve Rural District Council August 1997

Operator Name	Financial Viability of offer	Capital Investment	Method of Payment	Guarantee Payment
BIG GAME SAFARIS N \$4.2 MILLION	Not sure / YES	NOT STATED	NOT STATED	\$2.2 million for USA \$365,000 (Fixed)
CHIRONOMA N \$3.4 MILLION	YES	NOT STATED	NOT STATED	NOT STATED
SWAINSONS N \$3.3 MILLION	YES (Chirisa 1/4)	NOT STATED	2 Payments per yr 1 May & 15 Dec	\$2.9 million (2m)
	YES (Omay)	NOT STATED	NOT STATED	\$3.3 million 2m USA \$28,000
ILANSA SAFARIS N \$3.15-3.4 M	YES (Omay)	NOT STATED	NOT STATED	\$3.3 million USA 285,000
ZAMBEZI HUNTERS N \$3.1 MILLION	YES	\$43 m	2 Payments per yr 1 July 3 Dec	\$2.5 million 2m
	YES	NOT STATED	4 INSTALLMENTS	\$2.76 million

1. A table comparing financial offers from seven operators.

PERCENTAGE OF TURNOVER	TOURISM DEVELOPMENT	NON-FINANCIAL INCENTIVES TO THE COUNCIL	COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT	EMPLOYMENT CREATION	FUTURE PLANS
NIL	TOURISM INCLUDED IN PACKAGE - BUT NO DETAILS	NOTHING	YES GENERAL ASSISTANCE	30 JOBS	
35%?	NONE	NOTHING	YES GENERAL ASSISTANCE	14 JOBS	
45%	20% TOURISM	NOTHING	YES GENERAL ASSISTANCE	30 PERMANENT 30 CONTRACT	
48%	NO TOURISM	TRACTOR \$145,000	YES GENERAL ASSISTANCE	22 JOBS	
40%	NO TOURISM	TRACTOR \$145,000	YES GENERAL ASSISTANCE	21 JOBS	
40%	15%	ANTI POACHING VIBRE & RADIO WORK \$500,000	CONSTRUCTION OF ELECTRIC FENCE CAUSEWAY HERBIVORE SCHEME Sun Paved Trail	32 EXISTING 20 NEW	
46%	NO TOURISM	NOTHING	YES GENERAL ASSISTANCE	25 JOBS	

2. A second table comparing non-financial offers from the same seven operators



3. Discussing the advantages and disadvantages of the seven operators offers



4. Mission accomplished ! Two operators are chosen.

Background

Rural district councils (RDCs) with appropriate authority for managing wildlife are responsible for marketing leases to commercial sector partners. This manual has been designed to assist both executive officers and elected representatives with marketing wildlife leases and the structure of the contracts.

Maximising revenue

The choice of a private sector partner is based on many factors. Experience has shown that one of the most important considerations is how much money the operator will pay for the lease. The more revenue that is earned through the lease, the more money there is available for the RDC and the wildlife producer communities. For the producer communities this is important because they are the people who bear the cost of living with the wildlife resource.

Although a lease to a private sector commercial operator is the most common model in CAMPFIRE it is not the only option. There are examples of RDCs and producer communities managing their own activities. However experience has shown that the net revenue from these activities is usually lower than from leases to private sector operators.

What is marketing?

The word marketing is used to describe many different situations. In this manual it refers to all those activities which are necessary to achieve an efficient contract of fixed time period with a safari operator. The process starts with the decision on what to market and for how long the lease should run and goes through to the signing of the contract. The monitoring of these agreements is dealt with under a separate handbook- **Managing Safari Hunting**. This manual will stress simplicity and accountability; simple contracts are understood by more people, are easier to monitor and it is easier to calculate the revenues due to producer communities at the end of every year. This will lead to greater accountability in the district or ward's CAMPFIRE Programme.

Marketing experience

Some RDCs have had considerable experience in arranging contracts with the private sector. Contracts to harvest commercial timber most closely resemble wildlife leases. This manual has been approved by the Ministry of Local Government and National Housing (MLG&NH).

Sport hunting and tourism


Sport hunting is the main source of revenue to districts and producer communities with wildlife resources. This booklet is based on sport hunting but has a separate section for marketing tourism leases. However many of the principles in the first four chapters apply equally to both sport hunting and tourism leases.

Strategic wildlife management plans

This document assumes that some form of strategic wildlife management plans have been developed for the district, covering sport hunting, tourism, problem animal control etc. Ideally these plans should have been made with a strong input from the wildlife producer communities. Participatory landuse planning is covered in another manual in this series.

Decision making

In some districts the allocation of wildlife leases has been controversial. One of the main reasons for this, is that it is not always very clear who has the power to make what decision. Before the marketing process is started it is very important that the roles of the different sub-committees, the full council and the executive officers is clear. The role of outsiders should also be clarified before the process is started. As a general rule outsiders should be present to observe and advise as and when requested.




What principles should guide a community in marketing their wildlife?

The following four principles should always be followed when marketing any wildlife in a CAMPFIRE project:

1. Competition

Marketing wildlife competitively between many bidders or operators will most likely increase the value of the final contract.



2. Active participation

Decisions in CAMPFIRE should be taken by the people who stand to gain or lose by them i.e the members of the producer communities. Councils should not undertake marketing activities without their involvement. This means that:

- villagers who are representatives of “producer communities” must form the membership of the marketing and selection committee.
- members of the marketing and selection committee must learn about marketing through training programmes in order to be able to participate fully.


3. Openness

To avoid any suspicion of corruption, all marketing should be carried out openly rather than behind closed doors. Openness can be increased by:

- making sure that everyone follows all the tender procedures
- ensuring the selection committee is large (10+ people) with members of producer communities forming the majority
- allowing other members of the community to watch and ask questions at the proceedings
- inviting outside bodies such as DNPWLM (Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management) and MLGRUD (Ministry of Local Government and Urban Development) to observe and offer advice if requested.

4. Planning

Because wildlife leases are very valuable, tenders can easily become controversial. To avoid problems in the tender process it should be planned well in advance. When planning for a tender, the process should be simplified as much as possible. This will increase peoples understanding and reduce the confusion and suspicion.



Excerpt from the comic " Lighting the CAMPFIRE"

One of the first decisions that the RDC and the producer communities need to make is “how they are going to market” their leases. There are four basic methods of marketing, each of which has advantages and disadvantages.

1. Negotiation and roll-over

At the end of a contract period there is no rule which says that the lease must be competitively tendered. In the case where the RDC, the producer community and the safari operator are all happy with their current arrangements there is no reason why the contract should not be extended for an agreed period of time. Before both parties agree to “roll-over” a contract, the RDC and producer communities should analyse the financial performance of the contract. This can be done by comparing the results of their contract with other districts (see Chapter 6). When a contract is “rolled over” it gives both parties a chance to make minor improvements to the contract.

Advantages:

Reaching an agreement with a new safari operator always has some risk. When a contract is “rolled over”, the trust and the good working relationship that has been developed over several years is retained.


“Rolling over” a contract is also much less costly, both financially and in terms of time, than starting on the marketing process from the beginning.

Disadvantage:

Unless the negotiations are completely transparent there is always the danger that there will be allegations of corruption. There is also the danger that in a “roll-over” the producers will lose out on the opportunity to increase their income from wildlife.

Examples:

There have been several RDCs who have chosen to “roll-over” their contracts rather than re-tender them.



2. Postal tender only

A postal tender is when a standard tender document is provided to the potential safari operators and they complete it and return it to the RDC. The tenders are then opened, the submissions analysed by an agreed group of people “the selection committee” and the lease awarded to the winning operator. In this option there is no direct contact between the RDC selection committee and the potential operators.


Advantage:

A well designed standard postal tender can be very effective and quick way of selecting an operator for a wildlife lease.

Disadvantage:

A postal tender is often too simplistic and does not allow for a full evaluation of the the proposals. This can lead to the loss of income and accusations of corruption.

There is also no way of assessing the character of the applicants. Experience with marketing has shown that this is important to executive officers and the producer community.



3. Postal tender and interview

This option combines the postal tender (see above) with formal interviews of short-listed applicants. Once the postal tenders have been received and analysed, the “selection committee” chooses four or five of the top applications to come for an interview. This option is very similar to the selection of a new person to fill a vacant post. Because producer communities and RDC executive staff are still learning about the wildlife industry it is useful to get assistance from outsiders who are familiar with the industry and can provide the appropriate background. This will improve the quality of the interviews conducted

Advantage:


The interview stage allows the RDC and the producer community representatives to assess the applicants character. It also gives both parties the time to discuss the details of their plans, hopes and fears for the CAMPFIRE Programme.

In some districts the interview process has been used as a mini-auction where operators have increased their prices in order to be more competitive.

Disadvantage:

The extra step adds time and increases the cost of the marketing process.

The roles of all the participants and who has the power to make the final decision and how it will be made must be agreed on **before** the interviews.



4. The public auction

A public auction is guided by one rule, the highest price wins. In this option the “selection committee” would organise an auction, to be held in a public place for example a hotel or the council chamber. The operators would then compete against each other on price only. If this option is chosen then it is advisable to hire the services of a professional auctioneer.

Advantage:

The auction is highly accountable as the participants have to state their price in public. Because the highest price wins it is a very efficient way of maximising income from a lease.

Disadvantage:

There is always a risk in an auction that the winner will not be able to pay by the due date, there have been examples of winners “defaulting”

There is also less chance in an auction to evaluate the technical and social characteristics of the participants.

There is very little opportunity for the producer community to participate except as observers in the auction.

Example:

The Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management allocates most of its hunting rights through an auction process.



Summary

There is no right or wrong way to allocate wildlife leases in the communal lands. Each of the options discussed should be considered within the context of the district concerned.

The contract is the foundation of the relationship between the safari operator and the RDC and the producer communities.

The two most important parts of the contract are:

- the financial structure
- the length of the contract

It is important that the RDC and the producer communities agree on how long the contract should be and how the financial component will be structured **before** marketing the lease, as these decisions will shape the marketing process.

Other parts of the contract which are more flexible and can be negotiated during the marketing process are:

- what happens to the meat from animals shot on safari
- employment for local people
- other **non-financial** benefits from the lease
- monitoring and reporting
- the operators role in problem animal management
- whether sub-leasing is permissible
- relationships with community leaders
- relationships with other operators

The payment system

1. Decide on the payment system

There are four different ways in which a safari operator can be charged. These are:

- a single fee for the lease
- a fee for each animal shot
- a percentage of gross income
- individually negotiated “joint venture”

Single fee lease

This is a lump sum paid per annum irrespective of how many animals have been shot. The advantage of this form of lease is that there is very little risk to the RDC and producer communities. The disadvantage is that the total revenue earned will probably be lower than other forms of lease, because the operator bears all the risk.

Fee for each animal shot

Many RDCs and producer communities are charging a trophy fee for each animal shot since this is simple to administer. There is also a strong incentive for communities to conserve their wildlife because they can be paid directly for the animals that they produce.



When evaluating offers based on a fee for each animal shot, the total value of the quota and the value of the animals which are likely to be shot needs to be calculated. The total value of the quota gives the maximum income possible. However it is very unusual that the entire quota is hunted and so it is necessary to calculate, based on past records, what animals are likely to be shot. The contract in **Appendix 1** gives an indication of current trophy fees for this option.

For elephant in marginal hunting areas, there is a modification that can be used. Instead of a fixed fee per elephant hunted, the lease can be negotiated so that the operator pays a fee based on the weight of the ivory. A commonly used figure is US\$200 per kg of ivory.

Percentage of gross revenue

This is a lease where the RDC receives a certain percentage of the operators gross income. Leases of this structure should always be based on gross income, rather than net income which will be affected by the operators efficiency and ability to control costs. When formulating a lease with this structure it is very important to define how gross revenue is calculated and how it will be monitored. It is advisable to build in a guaranteed minimum income, so if there is a problem, the RDC and producer communities will receive some income. In CAMPFIRE contracts of this form are mostly between 20% and 30% of gross income. The advantage of this form of contract is that the risk is shared equally; if the operator has a good year then the RDC and producers will benefit as well. Similarly in a poor year, both will suffer. The disadvantage is that it is more difficult to monitor than, for example, the fee for each animal shot.

Individually negotiated joint venture

Recently some districts have been negotiating directly with safari operators to establish “joint ventures”. These are individually negotiated partnerships the details of which are beyond the scope of this manual. They are however an option which RDCs and producer communities might wish to investigate. Their advantage is that they provide security to both parties which can improve financial returns to both. This security is also good for wildlife management as the operator will have a long-term stake in the resource.

The disadvantage is that these agreements can be time consuming and difficult to negotiate. They also need the consent of the Ministry of Local Government Rural and Urban Development. RDCs considering this option should consult other districts with similar arrangements and seek professional financial and legal advice.

There is also the option of combining the options outlined above. For example there is no reason why a trophy fee cannot be combined with a lease fee. Their advantages and disadvantages are summarised in the following table.

Comparison of different methods of charging safari operators		
Structure of payment	Advantages	Disadvantages
A single fee for all trophies and the lease	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Income guaranteed regardless of how many animals shot. • Simple to administer. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The links between production and benefit are not clear. • Will probably not maximise income
Fee per animal shot, with a guaranteed minimum income.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Fees can be negotiated in US\$. • The links between production and benefit are clear. • Simple to administer. 	
Percentage of gross income, with a guaranteed minimum income.	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Gives incentives for operator and council to work together. • Risks are shared equally. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The links between production and benefit are not clear. • Can be difficult to administer and monitor.
Individually negotiated joint venture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Develop a contract to suit specific conditions. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Can take time to develop. • Usually needs expert advice

2. The length of the contract:

In the early days of CAMPFIRE, RDCs and producer communities tended to favour short contracts. This was understandable as they were still learning about the wildlife industry. In general longer contracts in wildlife areas will give security to the operator and RDC. This should increase the financial returns to the RDC and the producer community and increase the investment in the wildlife resource.

When there is some uncertainty over the lease, or the quota or even the operator, then it is advisable to have a shorter agreement. But when there is little or no uncertainty then longer term leases are preferable.

3. Protect yourself in any agreement

Councils should protect themselves in any agreement against changes in **exchange rates**, **inflation** or the failure of a safari operator to perform. How can this be done?

- changes in the **exchange rate**
Since the value of the Z\$ will continue to fall (see Chapter 6), always insist that figures are written into the contract as US\$ equivalents. These can then be converted to Z\$ for payments using the **exchange rate** on the day the payments are made.

- **inflation adjustments**

It is difficult to predict how high **inflation** may be over the contract period. In Z\$ terms it may be between 20-30%, whereas the rate of annual **inflation** overseas, for example in the USA, has recently averaged less than 5%. So again, the best practice is to insist on charging fees in US\$ equivalents.

- **failure to perform**

Protect yourself by insisting on a guaranteed minimum income to be paid whatever happens. This might be in the form of the operator guaranteeing to pay for a certain number of animals even though he might not shoot them.

- **regular payments**

Some RDCs have not maximised their income by allowing their operators to miss payment deadlines. The lease agreements should stipulate regular payments of monies owed and RDCs should enforce this. If the operator defaults penalty charges should be levied.

- **escape clauses**

All contracts should have escape clauses. They allow one or both parties to terminate the agreement should conditions change. Escape clauses should deal with the investments and the loss of earnings incurred by RDCs, producer communities and the safari operator.

How should an RDC or a community go about marketing its hunting?

1. Decide exactly what you wish to sell

Your committee will need to make decisions about:

- **what** animals are going to be hunted
- **where** the hunting will take place,
- **how** long the hunting agreement with a safari operator should last for.
- the **structure** of the contract
- **how** you are going to market it

2. Advertise the hunting lease

Advertising a hunting tender should take place at least six months before it is to begin. This will allow safari operators to market their hunts well in advance so that they can raise their income and probably yours as well.

The time of year at which the marketing is done is also important. In January and February most safari operators are out of the country marketing their hunting while July, August and September are their busiest hunting times. Clearly leases should not be marketed during these periods if at all possible.

You may also wish to inform the Safari Operators Association of Zimbabwe (SOAZ) well before the tender date so that they can inform their membership of the availability of the lease.

HUNTING LEASE Chilazi District Council

Tenders are invited for a 5 year hunting lease in the Chilazi District beginning on 1st January, 1990.

The quota for this area includes
8 trophy elephant and
24 trophy buffalo.


For further information contact
Chilazi District Council
PO Box 310
Chilazi
telephone 8016593


On application interested persons will be supplied with further information on the lease area and the composition of quotas. Tenders will close on Friday 30th June, 1989.

3. Produce additional information and tender forms

Because advertising costs are high, you may wish to include only a brief outline of the lease area in your advert. You should also supply additional information in a pack for those people who reply to the advert. It should contain the following details:

- a covering letter explaining the contents of the information pack and the proposed agreement.
- the full quota.
- a description of the area, including a map showing the boundaries.
- a summary of the success of any hunting that has taken place previously, including for example the proportion of the quota shot, and the trophy quality.
- the date by which the tender is to be submitted. A period of at least a month should be given.
- whether prospective winners of the tender may be called for an interview before a final decision is made.
- a standard tender form for completion and submission.





An example of a standard tender form is given on page 21. Generally in the early stages of the tender less importance should be given to the **non-financial** payments. This is because non-financial offers have several disadvantages.

They are:

- difficult to compare
- open to abuse
- difficult to allocate amongst producer communities.

For these reasons it is best to make your tenders strictly financial. It need not reduce your options, since the money can always be used later to pay for goods or services which the communities decide they want.

Remember to follow standard government tender procedures. Tenders should not be opened until the exact time on the due date and should only be opened in an agreed forum with members of the community present.

4. Selection of short listed candidates

If a tender process has been well planned and standard tender documents have been used, then there should be very little problem selecting operators, from among the applicants, to come for an interview. When the selection committee is evaluating the applications they must be careful to consider both the “guaranteed” and “expected” income. Where an applicant gives a very high “expected” income but is only prepared to guarantee a very low income then the committee should ask themselves why? Although this manual argues that the **non-financial** aspects of the tender should not be given too much weight, factors such as the operators experience, especially in communal lands is important.

5. Interview tender applicants

Before a final decision is made, some or all of the applicants should be interviewed. Hints about how to interview are given on pages 22-23. Members of the producer communities should be actively involved in this.

Interviewing should improve the offer since:

- during the interview you can often bargain up the prices offered. First offers are rarely final offers;
- some of the terms can be renegotiated individually, allowing a contract which is tailored to your exact requirements to be made;
- tenders may not contain all the details. An interview is more flexible and allows you to raise issues and clarify points.

Interviews also allow:

- the selection committee to assess the trustworthiness and attitude of the operator and get to know the applicant before a final decision is made;
- the old “colonial” relationship to be reversed so that it becomes clear that it is the community that owns and manages the wildlife now;
- both the selection committee and community observers to learn about business and hunting.

6. Draw up a legal contract

Every agreement entered into with a safari operator should be written down as a legal contract. The contract should list the length of the agreement, what happens to the meat, any employment created and specify exactly the payments for the wildlife. The contract will be based on the tender which has been selected.

A contract should be kept as simple as possible, so that all the members of the selection committee can understand it and in turn can explain its provisions to anyone who may ask. A sample contract is included as an appendix at the back of this booklet.

Although simplicity is important for accountability and monitoring, the document must be legally binding. RDCs and private sector partners are strongly advised to have their contracts scrutinised by a lawyer.

An Example of a Standard Tender Form

This is the most important to compare between tenders

The closer this is to the quota, the more money you will earn

Example of a standardised tender form						
Species	Quota	Price offered per animal	I guarantee to shoot the following	I expect to shoot the following:	Guaranteed price	Expected price
Elephant	6				Calculated by multiplying guaranteed offtake by price	Calculated by multiplying expected offtake by price.
Buffalo	20					
Leopard	10					
Lion	4					
Sable	8					
etc.	X					
etc.	X					
			TOTAL TROPHY FEE OFFER			
			LEASE FEE			
GUARANTEED INCOME (this may be more than the sum of concession and trophy fees)						
EXPECTED INCOME						
OTHER BENEFITS OFFERED IN KIND (please specify on attached sheet. Note that limited attention will be given to such offers)						
Fees will be paid in the following manner:						
	Upon signing the lease					
Date	January	June	September	December 31		
Amount						
Description	Lease fee Proportion of guaranteed trophy fees.		Proportion of guaranteed trophy fees. Plus full payment of all animals shot to date.	Remainder of guaranteed trophy fees. Plus full payment of all animals shot to date.	Full Payment	

This should be negotiated with the safari operator

Benefits in kind are difficult to compare or allocate and not as useful as cash

HOW TO INTERVIEW

Before the interview

Before the selection committee conducts interviews they should make sure that they are adequately prepared. This will involve them in:

- **gathering information**

The committee must have sufficient knowledge about wildlife, the prices being offered elsewhere, the factors affecting these and any problems which operators may have.

- **practising interview techniques**


It is important that the “right” questions are asked at an interview in order to get the information required. Practising interview techniques through “role plays” before considering the tenders will make sure that the selection committee is sufficiently confident.

- **assessing each tender**

The interviewing committee should meet to consider each tender. As well as looking at the income which is being offered, the committee should draw up a list of issues to be discussed with each operator. These may include the operator’s:



- business and hunting experience
- knowledge of the area to be hunted
- local employment
- language and communication skills
- character-trustworthiness,
- relationship with the community

What do we know about the way this safari operator works?



OPERATOR 1	Ranking
Hunting experience Good - 12 years in CAMPFIRE	4
Knowledge of area to be hunted	2
Local employment	4
Language	2
Character-	4
Relationship with community	4
5=Excellent 4=Good 3=Satisfactory 2=Unsatisfactory 1=Poor	

Hmm, I'd better ring Moyo in Hurungwe and Sibanda in Beitbridge and find out what they expect to be offered.



In addition the committee may wish to negotiate a higher price, discuss the potential for tourism or the conflict that may result from tourism, amend the length of the contract and consider the issue of problem animal control.

At the interview

Each candidate should be interviewed in turn. Using your checklist of issues to assess, make sure that every point is raised and clarified to the committee's satisfaction. Don't rush interviews since they are an important learning exercise and the start to a deal which may eventually be worth millions of dollars.

After each interview, a summary like the one below, should be prepared of each candidate's performance. This will help you remember important issues later when the committee comes to a decision.

After the interview

Once the "selection committee" has interviewed all the applicants, the summary chart should be used as a guide to selecting the best operator. This may involve the committee in deciding between an operator the committee thinks is trustworthy but pays less, and one that pays more but who may be more difficult to work with.

These are not easy decisions and it is important that the selection committee debates these issues fully and comes to a decision which everyone accepts. This is why it is important that the "selection committee" is dominated by people from the area where the operator is going to hunt.

	OPERATOR 1	OPERATOR 2	OPERATOR 3
Payment offered	500 000	3 550,000	4 600,000
Guaranteed income	500 000	5 400,000	3 400,000
Hunting experience	Good - 12 years in CAMPFIRE	4	No experience 2 in CAMPFIRE
Knowledge of area to be hunted	Not good- all experience in lowveld	2	Very little 1
Local employment	1 6full-time 50 casual	4	12 full-time 40 casual
Language	Fluent Shangaan	2	Poor Shona
Character-trustworthiness	Good	4	Good
Relationship with community	Potentially good	4	Potentially good
		4	4
		Uncertain	2
		Unclear	2



Currently most of the income to the CAMPFIRE Programme comes from sport hunting leases. However, many people believe that the lease of areas within the communal lands for tourism purposes has not been fully exploited and in the next few years more tourism leases are expected to be developed. This chapter will outline the key issues RDCs and producer communities should be thinking about when planning to lease an area for the purposes of tourism.

The financial rate of return to the operator is normally higher from sport hunting than tourism . This is because:

- Tourism developments often require a much greater level of capital investment than for sport hunting.
- Tourism sites often need time to develop a “good reputation” and may operate at a loss for the first few years.

Because of these factors tourist operators usually require much longer leases than sport hunting operators. The returns to the RDC and producer communities are often lower. On average an RDC would expect to receive between 20% and 30% of gross sport hunting revenue as a lease fee. In a tourism lease the percentage of gross revenue paid as a lease fee is usually between 10% and 15%.

1. Principles of marketing

The principles of marketing which are outlined in Chapter 1, also apply to tourism leases. These are:

1. Competition
2. Active participation
3. Openness
4. Planning

2. Marketing methods

The marketing methods which were discussed in Chapter 2 also apply to tourism leases. These are:

1. Negotiation and roll-over
2. Postal tender only
3. Postal tender and interview
4. Public auction

Because leases for tourism are often longer than hunting leases and involve a greater capital investment by the lessee than hunting leases they are generally more complex. This means that the very simple marketing methods such as the postal tender and the public auction are not very appropriate, although they can be used.

3. The Contract

There are four different ways in which RDCs and producer communities can charge operators for the lease of a site:

1. A set fee per guest per night
2. A single lease fee for the site per annum
3. A percentage of gross revenue
4. An individually negotiated "joint venture"

As with the sport hunting leases, RDCs and producer communities are urged to set a minimum level of guaranteed income to ensure full use of the site and to give themselves some insurance.

Fee per guest per night

Under this system each operator pays a fee per guest night. It would be reasonable to expect this fee to increase as the business develops and the lessee begins to earn a profit. The system divides the risk equally between the operator and the RDC / producer communities because if the venture is successful both parties benefit.

Advantages:

This is a very simple system to implement and monitor

Disadvantage:

It is difficult to predict the changes in fee structures that might happen over a long contract.

Single lease fee for the site per annum

Under this system the operator pays a lump sum per annum for the lease of the site. As with fee per guest night, it would be reasonable to expect this fee to increase as the business develops. The RDC will need to decide how and when the payment is made. To lessen the burden on the lessee it might be appropriate to structure the contract so that the fee is paid at regular intervals over the year.

Advantage:

The system is very simple to administer and provides the RDC and the producer community with a guaranteed income.

Disadvantage:

It is often difficult to predict how the business will perform. If the venture is a success the RDC might find itself getting a very small percentage of gross income. Conversely if the business doesn't live up to expectation the RDC might find itself getting a very large proportion of the gross income but this is not sustainable in the long term.

Examples:

There are no known examples of this form of contract which only uses the single fee. However it is often useful to combine a single lease fee with another option to ensure that the site is fully utilised and that the RDC and producer communities have a guaranteed income (see page 29).

Percentage of gross revenue

The use of a percentage of gross income is the most commonly used payment system for tourism leases. Under the system the RDC and producer communities receive a percentage of the operators gross income. Under most leases this figure increases with time to account for the capital investment and the time needed to develop a tourist operation. As with the sport hunting leases the figure should be based on gross revenue rather than net income. Care should be taken to carefully define what gross revenue is and how it is to be monitored. This system can be used together with single lease fee in order to guarantee a certain income to the RDC and the producer communities.

Advantage:

The system allocates risk evenly between the operator and the RDC. If the business performs well then both parties will benefit.

Examples: The tourist ventures in Hurungwe, Nyaminyami and Chipinge Districts are based on this system.

Individually negotiated “joint venture”

As with the sport hunting leases, all parties might feel the need to negotiate a partnership or joint venture. The advantages and disadvantages of these “joint ventures” are exactly the same as for the sport hunting leases. RDCs considering this option should seek specialist financial and legal advice.

Length of contract

The reasons why tourism leases are usually longer than sport hunting contracts have been discussed. The current legislation limits the maximum lease period that can be granted by RDCs in the communal lands, to ten years.

5. Other factors to be considered

Zonation for tourism purposes:

In good wildlife areas tourist activities can usually be carried out over a smaller area than is necessary for hunting. However, operators entering into tourism leases in the communal lands normally require guarantees of exclusive rights to an area in which to operate. This means excluding other forms of wildlife utilisation (especially sport hunting and cropping) and human settlement.

Relationship with protected areas managed by DNP&WLM:

Many of the tourism leases that are currently operating in the communal lands have arrangements with DNP&WLM to enter the adjacent protected areas. If permission is needed to enter a protected area, the RDCs should negotiate this with the DNP&WLM and then sub-lease the rights to the tourist operator as part of the lease. The rights should be transferable to appropriately qualified persons or organisations.

Capital development:

Due to the level of capital development required for tourism purposes the contract must deal with the issue of compensation when the lease ends. There should also be clauses covering compensation for capital development if for any reason the lease ends prematurely. RDCs and producer communities should aim to minimise their financial obligations at the end of the contract period.

Development and maintenance of supporting infrastructure:

A tourist operation might require considerable supporting infra-structure, such as roads, water supplies electricity and accommodation for staff. The contract should be explicit as to who bears the cost of installation, maintenance and compensation.

6. Other activities:

A communal land tourism operation might provide an opportunity for other business initiatives. These might include: locally guided cultural tours, campsites for tourists who prefer outdoor recreation, and for outlets for craft products.

Notes on the tourism cashflow analysis:

Gross income: This is the money earned by the camp by accommodating and providing services to tourists.

Operating expenses: These are the running costs of the camp excluding the lease fees to the RDC.

Lease fee (1): The lease fee is paid to the RDC on an annual basis. It increases at 10% per annum.

Percent of gross income: This is the proportion of the gross income which the operator has to pay to the RDC in addition to the lease fee.

Payment (2): This is the amount of money, calculated from the gross income, that the operator has to pay the RDC.

Total payment to RDC (1+2): This is the total amount paid by the operator to the RDC each year.

Percent of income as lease fees: This is the amount paid to the RDC as a percent of the total income of the tourist camp.

Operators profit: This is the gross income minus the operating costs and the total payment to the RDC.



Example of a cashflow analysis for a tourist camp

Income is low at the start when the camp is being set up but increases as it develops.

The single lease fee rises by 10% per annum.

Over the 10 year lease the RDC will receive 16% of the anticipated income. Payments are usually structured so that the RDC still receives money even at the start of its project when the safari operator is not making a profit.


Safari Camp Operators (Pvt.) Ltd. Cash Flow Analysis 1990-1999

	Year 1	Year 2	Year 3	Year 4	Year 5	Year 6	Year 7	Year 8	Year 9	Year 10	Total
Income	90,000	100,000	200,000	500,000	1,000,000	1,150,000	1,150,000	1,150,000	1,150,000	1,150,000	7,640,000
Operating Costs	120,000	150,000	275,000	400,000	475,000	550,000	550,000	550,000	550,000	550,000	4,170,000
Lease fee (1)	12,000	13,200	14,520	15,972	17,569	19,326	21,259	23,385	25,723	28,295	191,249
Percent of gross income	7.5%	8.5%	9.5%	10.5%	11.5%	12.5%	13.5%	14.5%	15%	15%	
Payment (2)	6,750	8,500	19,000	25,500	115,000	143,750	155,250	166,750	172,500	172,500	1,012,500
Total payment to RDC (1+2)	18,750	21,700	33,520	68,472	132,596	163,076	176,509	190,135	198,223	200,795	1,203,749
Percent of income as lease fees	21%	22%	17%	14%	13%	14%	15%	17%	17%	17%	16%
Operators profit	(48,750)	(71,700)	(108,520)	31,528	392,431	436,924	423,941	409,865	401,777	399,205	2,266,251


The total payment to the RDC is made up of the lease fee and the percent of gross revenue.

In the first three years the operator makes no profit.

The percentage of gross revenue paid to the RDC increases with time.




Devaluation of the Zimbabwe dollar against the US dollar



There has been a significant increase in the revenue earned, under the CAMPFIRE Programme, from sport hunting. In 1989 Z\$694,773 was earned by two districts. In 1995 Z\$13 million was earned by 16 districts (see figure below). Part of this increase is due to the devaluation of the Zimbabwean dollar against all major currencies. In US dollars the revenue from sport hunting has increased from US\$326,798 to US\$1,4 million over the same period.


Increasing Income from Sport Hunting



1. Marketing efficiency

Despite the increase in the number of districts and the devaluation of the Zimbabwean dollar, the real earnings from sport hunting have increased. This is mostly due to the improved marketing of wildlife leases by the RDCs. In 1989 contracts were in Zimbabwe dollars and were based on Government trophy fees used by DNP&WLM. Since then districts have developed their own range of contracts to suit their specific conditions and most of them use US dollar equivalents to protect themselves against devaluation and **inflation**. The result has been that the efficiency of sport hunting in the communal lands improved steadily between 1991 and 1994, from 0.33 to 0.57. The fall in 1995, to 0.46 has not yet been fully investigated.

National Sport Hunting Efficiency



The index used to measure the efficiency was developed by Brian Child of the CAMPFIRE Unit of the DNP&WLM to measure the changes in efficiency of sport hunting in the communal lands. The index is calculated as follows:

1. Calculate the standard value of the quota for the area of interest. The set of standard US dollar values is found in Appendix Two.
2. Calculate the total income earned from the lease in US dollars.
3. Divide the actual income earned by the standard value of the quota.

The higher the index the more efficient the hunting in that particular area. The index is very useful for comparing the results of one lease area with another within a district or for comparing between districts. Those wishing to read more about the index and how it can be used should get a copy of the document “**A summary of the marketing of trophy quotas in CAMPFIRE areas 1990 - 1993**”, by Brian Child and published by DNP&WLM.

**Comparison of Sport Hunting Efficiency
between Districts “A” and “B”**

District	Value of quota (US\$)	Income earned (US\$)	Efficiency Index
A	96,300	74,856	0.77
B	153,200	80,145	0.52

The example shows that the sport hunting in District A was more efficient than in District B, although District B actually earned more money than District A. Those persons involved in allocating and structuring the lease in District B should endeavour to find out what the causes of this difference are and see if it is possible to improve the performance of their own contracts.

2. Factors affecting the efficiency of sport hunting

If the index is going to be used it is important to know what factors might affect the results:

The quota:

In some districts the quota might be too big or include animals that are very difficult to hunt. This will lower the efficiency of a hunting lease. This information should be fed back into quota setting workshops and the quota adjusted as necessary.

The safari operator:

Any factor which leads to the safari operator not hunting all the animals on the quota will reduce the efficiency index. Many operators combine communal land hunting with ranch hunts in the lowveld and do not fully utilise the plains game quotas. In this situation the RDC and producer community should provide incentives for the operator to use the whole quota and increase their income.


The contract:

The financial structure of the contract, the payment system, the lease period and most importantly how the operator was chosen will all affect the efficiency of the contract.


The sport hunting efficiency index is a tool to guide CAMPFIRE managers and producer community representatives. It can only account for the financial performance of the lease, as discussed in this manual there are many other important factors which influence the selection of commercial safari operator. These factors should be considered together with the index.

3. Lessons learned from CAMPFIRE for marketing leases

- **encouraging competition leads to more bids**
By promoting open competitive bidding for concessions and leases, RDC's are ensuring that the full market value of the wildlife resource is being gained.



- **adopting a tender system drives prices up**
A system where one bidder is not aware of another bidder's offer, tends to ensure that the best possible bid is submitted by each tenderer. In Tsholotsho, Chipinge and Hurungwe the prices received after changing to a tender system improved dramatically.
- **interviews may result in better offers**
Apart from their other advantages, operators will often reconsider their bid at an interview in order to try and secure the contract. The example below is based on a real situation where one bid was increased by 60%.



- **flexible payment structures**

In contrast to Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ), most RDC's have structured the payments from safari operators to allow up to four instalments a year. This means that the safari operator in communal lands has a healthy cash flow and does not have to borrow large sums of money from a bank at high interest rates to pay for the lease in advance. In turn this means that instead of spending large amounts of his earnings repaying a loan, the operator can increase the amount of money offered to RDC's.

- **providing better information**

In a situation where districts are given a guide to the value of trophy prices and are aware of what other districts are earning, they should be able to secure the best possible price for their wildlife quota.

4. Concluding comment

The income to CAMPFIRE is heavily dependent on sport hunting (+/- 90%) and sport hunting is heavily dependent on the revenue from elephants (+/- 60%). In the short-term sport hunting quotas are unlikely to be increased substantially. This places an effective ceiling on the earning power of CAMPFIRE, unless RDCs begin to diversify. There is undeveloped tourism potential within the communal lands and although it will not earn the same magnitude of income for the RDCs and producer communities it needs to be developed.

GLOSSARY

inflation - An increase in the general level of prices in a country.

exchange rate - The price of one country's currency in Zimbabwe dollars. For example; US \$1 costs Z\$13. The rate of exchange is therefore Z\$13 to US\$1.

devaluation - When the cost of the US\$ increases in Z\$ terms the Zimbabwean dollar is said to have depreciated.

non-financial - No money involved.

escape clause - Is a section in a contract which allows both parties to break the contract should certain events happen.

RDC - Rural District Council.

MLG&NH - Ministry of Local Government and National Housing.

DNP&WLM - Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management.

GoZ - Government of Zimbabwe.

Appendix One

AGREEMENT BETWEEN CHILAZI RURAL DISTRICT COUNCIL

AND

SAFARI HUNTERS FOR THE UTILIZATION OF WILDLIFE RESOURCES

Authority to hunt and remove the animals listed on the attached quota from the Chilazi Communal Land has been granted to SAFARI HUNTERS by Chilazi Rural District Council in terms of Statutory Instrument 63 of 1991.

This contract is valid for the period 1 Jan 1998 to 31 Dec 1998.

TERMS AND CONDITIONS

- 1) Chilazi Rural District Council grants Safari Hunters (here-after referred to as the Operator) permission to conduct hunting in Chilazi Communal Land.
- 2) The Council permits the Operator to set up one camp site and a number of fly-camps. The actual sites must be acceptable to the Ward Wildlife Management Committee of the respective ward.
- 3) The concessionaire shall comply with the requirements of the Parks and Wild Life Act (1975) and regulations and any other relevant council by-laws and codes of conduct issued in respect of access to the wildlife of Chilazi District.
- 4) The Operator shall complete a hunting permit in triplicate in respect of each client before the hunt and post it to the Council. Upon receipt of the permit the Council shall sign and stamp such permits and return them by post to the Operator without delay.

Within 30 days of the expiry date of each such permit the Operator shall deliver to the Council the appropriate hunting return forms in respect of each such permit together with payment for the total number of animals taken as disclosed by such hunting return forms.
- 5) The Rural District Council reserve the right of inspection and access to the information pertaining to the conditions of this agreement.
- 6) All carcasses become the property of the Operator.

7) No animal may be shot from a vehicle. A wounded animal will be considered as shot. Night shooting is permitted in the case of lions which are raiding livestock. Lions which are hunted using a "bait" must be hunted according to normal hunting ethics.

8) Where the sex of the animal has been specified on the permit, the opposite sex of the same species shall not be hunted instead.

9) The following information is required on the hunting return form at the end of each hunt;

- date of shooting
- trophy size
- sex of animal shot
- locstat (6 figures grid reference) of where the animal was shot or wounded
- lower jaw should be handed in to the Rural District Council, and should be marked in such a way that it can be compared with the respective hunting return forms.

Failure to correctly complete the forms will be considered a breach of the contract.

10) Hunting return forms are issued in 4 copies and the distribution of copies will be as follows:

- 1st Copy - Black ink (Campfire Unit, DNPWLM)
- 2nd Copy- Red ink (Campfire Association)
- 3rd Copy - Blue ink (Rural District Council)
- 4th Copy - Black ink (Operator)

11) Hunting permits are issued at the offices of Chilazi Rural District Council and no permit is valid without a council date stamp and the signature or an authorised officer of the Rural District Council.

Further, the Operator must take it upon himself to notify the Chief in an area before hunting takes place in that area. The Chief or the WVMC of an area may, if they so wish, nominate someone to accompany the Operator when on a hunt.

12) The Operator will pay the following fees:

- a. half the value of the fixed quota as a deposit, based on the exchange rate on the day that the contract is signed.
- b. The payment of the other half of the total fixed quota will be calculated using the exchange rate at the time the hunting permit is issued.
- c. Trophy fees for those animals hunted on the optional quota are to be paid within 30 days of the completion of the hunt based on the exchange rate on the last day of the hunt.
- d. If all the animals on the fixed quota are not shot, the balance of the 50% of the fixed quota trophy fees is to be paid not later than January 31 1999.

13) The hunting area has been divided into 2 areas according to the quotas:

Area 1 consisting of the following wards: 1,2,3,4 and 5

Area 2 consisting of the following wards: 8,9,19,11 and 19

- 14) In case of a breach of the contract, the agreement can be terminated by either party giving at least one month's notice.
- 15) The renewed contract is to be signed not later than the 31 January of the same year or when DNP&WLM releases the year's hunting quota. Deposit of 50% of the fixed trophy fees is to be paid upon signing of the contract.
- 16) In the event of the present five year term of lease expiring at the 31 December of 2000 the lease will be:
- a. Re-negotiated by the Operator for a further term of 5 or 10 years as the Council sees fit based on the previous operational records and services rendered. This will be in conjunction with the non-consumptive safaris agreement.
 - b. If negotiation fails, the lease will be put to tender and the Operator will have the option to meet the highest tender which will be binding for the terms of the tender submitted.
 - c. On termination or cancellation of the contract, the Operator may remove from the wildlife area, all his movable property within 60 days from the date of cancellation or termination of the contract. Council will then take the responsibility of selling the immovable property to the new operator at a price to be determined by Council. The proceeds from such a sale will be shared between the former operator and the council at 70 - 30% respectively. The 30% recovered by council will be mainly to cover for the costs incurred when facilitating the sale of the property. The sale should be done within 90 days of the date of termination or cancellation.

Thus signed by the parties:

SIGNATURE :DATE :
 COUNCIL CHAIRMAN

SIGNATURE :DATE :
 SAFARI OPERATOR

SIGNATURE :DATE :
 C.E.O.

CHILALAZI DISTRICT (AREA 1)

Species	Total Quota 1995	Fixed Quota	PAC / Cull/Opt. Quota	Unit Trophy Fees		Unit Trophy Fees Z\$	Total Fixed Quota Z\$	Total Opt. Quota Z\$
				Fees US\$	Fees Z\$			
Elephant (M)	7	5	2	10,000	130,000	650,000	260,000	
Elephant (F)	15	5	10	1,500	19,500	97,500	190,500	
Buffalo (M)	20	20	0	1,200	15,600	312,000	0	
Buffalo(F)	5	3	2	350	4,550	13,650	27,300	
Lion (M)	3	0	3	2,500	32,500	0	97,500	
Lion (F)	3	0	3	1,200	15,600	0	46,800	
Leopard	5	4	1	1,600	20,800	83,200	20,800	
Spot Hyena	10	4	6	120	1,560	6,240	9,360	
Sable	1	0	1	1,400	18,200	0	18,200	
Eland	1	1	0	700	9,100	9,100	0	
Kudu (M)	6	4	2	450	5,850	23,400	11,700	
Bushbuck	8	6	2	250	3,250	19,500	6,500	
Waterbuck (M)	4	4	0	800	10,400	41,600	0	
Reedbuck	1	0	1	200	2,600	0	2,600	
Zebra	2	0	2	450	5,850	0	11,700	
Bushpig	5	2	3	60	780	1,560	2,340	
Warthog	10	2	8	60	780	1,560	6,240	
Impala(M)	40	20	80	60	780	15,600	62,400	
Duiker	10	4	6	60	780	3,120	4,680	
Klipspringer	5	3	2	200	2,600	7,800	5,200	
Sharpes. Grysbok	10	5	5	60	780	3,900	3,900	
Honey Badger	1	0	1	30	390	0	390	
Civet	1	0	1	50	650	0	650	
Serval	1	0	1	50	650	0	650	
Jackal	4	0	4	20	260	0	1,040	
Wild Cat	1	0	1	20	260	0	260	
Genet	2	0	2	20	260	0	520	
Porcupine	2	0	2	20	260	0	520	
Baboon	10	5	5	10	130	650	650	
Vervet monk	5	0	5	10	130	0	650	
Springhare	10	0	10					
Guinea Fowl	50	0	50	Springhare + all fowls =				
Francolin	50	0	50	100	1,300	1,300		
Sandgrouse	50	0	50					
Pigeons/ Dove	500	0	500					
Ducks	20	0	20					

TOTAL **\$1,291,680** **\$793,500**

CHILAZI DISTRICT (AREA 2)

Species	Total Quota 1995	Fixed Quota	PAC / Cull/Opt. Quota	Unit Trophy Fees US\$	Unit Trophy Fees Z\$	Total Fixed Quota Z\$	Total Opt. Quota Z\$
Elephant (M)	1	0	1	10,000	130,000	0	130,000
Elephant (F)	2	0	2	1,500	19,500	0	39,000
Hippopotamus	1	0	1	1,200	15,600	0	15,600
Crocodile	2	0	2	750	9,750	0	9,750
Kudu (M)	1	0	1	450	5,850	0	5,850
8bushbuck	1	0	1	250	3,250	0	3,250
Reedbuck	1	0	1	200	2,600	0	2,600
Bushpig	2	0	2	60	780	0	1,560
Warthog	1	0	1	60	780	0	780
Impala (M)	4	0	4	60	780	0	3,120
Duiker	2	0	2	60	780	0	1,560
Klipspringer	2	0	2	200	2,600	0	5,200
Honey Badger	1	0	1	50	650	0	650
Civet	1	0	1	50	650	0	650
Serval	1	0	1	50	650	0	650
Jackal	2	0	2	20	260	0	520
Wild Cat	1	0	1	20	260	0	260
Genet	2	0	2	20	260	0	520
Porcupine	2	0	2	20	260	0	520
Spring Hare	10	0	10	2	26	0	260
Baboon	10	0	10	10	130	0	1,300
Vervet Monk	10	0	10	10	130	0	1,300
Guinea Fowl	20	0	20	1	13	0	260
Francolin	20	0	20	1	13	0	260
Sandgrouse	20	0	20	2	26	0	520
Pigeons/Dove	500	0	500	2	26	0	13,000
Ducks	20	0	20	1	13	0	260
TOTAL							\$239,200

Appendix Two

Standard Values used for the efficiency of sport hunting in Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE Programme (source; Child 1995)

<u>Species</u>	<u>US\$ Trophy Fee</u>
Elephant (M)	\$10,000
Elephant (F)	\$3,000
Buffalo (M)	\$1,200
Buffalo (F)	\$500
Lion	\$2,500
Lioness	\$1,200
Leopard	\$1,600
Hyaena	\$120
Hippopotamus	\$1,500
Giraffe	\$1,000
Crocodile	\$1,000
Sable	\$1,500
Eland	\$700
Kudu (M)	\$450
Kudu (F)	\$250
Nyala	\$1,200
Bushbuck	\$250
Waterbuck	\$800
Reedbuck	\$250
Wildebeest	\$400
Tsesebe	\$400
Zebra	\$450
Bushpig	\$50
Warthog	\$50
Impala (M)	\$75
Impala (F)	\$50
Duiker	\$50
Steenbok	\$50
Klipspringer	\$200
Grysbok	\$50
Honey badger	\$50
Civet	\$50
Serval	\$50
Jackal	\$25
Wild cat	\$25
Genet	\$25
Porcupine	\$25

This booklet is the third in a series of guides on Wildlife Management and examines in detail the different ways in which wildlife leases can be marketed. It provides background information and guidance to Rural District Councils and should be read along with the other booklets in this series. Together they provide information and guidance in turn, to members of villages, wards and rural districts involved in the management of Campfire projects. These booklets are linked to training programmes being undertaken by members of the CAMPFIRE Collaborative Group.

Booklets in the Wildlife Management series include:

- 1. Problem Animal Reporting**
- 2. Electric Fencing Projects**
- 3. Marketing Wildlife**
- 4. Safari Hunting**
- 5. Quota Setting Manual**

WWF is a member of the Collaborative Group supporting the CAMPFIRE programme in Zimbabwe and has provided support and training to communities in the establishment of wildlife management systems.